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REGULATING ROOMMATE RELATIONS: 
PROTECTION OR ATTACK AGAINST NEW 
YORK CITY’S TENANTS? 
Laurel R. Dick* 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 20, 2000, the New York State Division of 
Housing and Community Renewal (“DHCR”) promulgated an 
amendment to the Rent Stabilization Code (“the code”) that 
governs all rent stabilized housing in New York City.1 This 
amendment, section 2525.7 of the code, took on a task that was 
novel to rent regulation in New York, the regulation of roommate 
relations.2 It prohibits tenants from charging their roommates 
more than a “proportionate” share of the rent under any 
circumstance.3 An analysis of the statutory history demonstrates 
that this provision’s novelty is not creative innovation, but rather 
an unauthorized interference with the protected tenant-roommate 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2003; B.A., Grinnell College, 1997. 
The author would like to thank Professor George Johnson, David Robinson, 
and especially Edward Josephson. She would also like to thank Greg for his 
patience and support. 
1 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2525.7 (2001) (recording 
effective date as Dec. 20, 2000 in “Historical Note”). See also Hutchins v. 
Conciliation and Appeals Bd., 480 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (finding that 
Rent Stabilization Law and Code are binding authority in regards to New York 
City rent stabilized units). 
2 § 2525.7. 
3 Id. 
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relationship.4 
While an examination of the current state of the rental market 
shows that protection of roommates is warranted, interference is 
not necessarily protection. Interference with the tenant-roommate 
relationship can only be justified if the regulation puts the remedy 
in the hands of the proper party—the roommate—and limits its 
effects to real, unjustified profiteering by tenants at the expense 
of their roommates.5 Section 2525.7 (“the proportionality 
provision”) has done neither of these things, but has instead 
created the potential for large-scale eviction of tenants and the 
simultaneous eviction of their roommates.6 
Part I of this note describes the regulatory context in which 
the proportionality provision was promulgated including relevant 
New York statutes, codes and caselaw. Part II explains the two 
main flaws in the design of the provision as a roommate 
protection. Finally, Part III demonstrates that protection of 
roommates against gross overcharge is justified only if it is done 
in a way that actually protects the roommate and does not 
infringe unnecessarily on the rights of the primary tenants. Part 
III also includes proposals for designing a roommate protection 
provision that is successful to those ends—a difficult but 
workable task. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 1983, DHCR was given authority by the New York State 
Legislature to administer the Rent Stabilization Law in New York 
City through the code.7 In promulgating the proportionality 
provision, DHCR made a significant departure from the usual 
approach to the tenant-roommate relationship taken by the state 
legislature through the Rent Stabilization Law, and by the courts 
                                                          
4 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-f (McKinney 2001). See infra note 24 
(explaining how DHCR’s promulgation lacked authority). 
5 See infra Part II.A-B. 
6 See infra Part II.A-B. 
7 Omnibus Housing Act, 1983 N.Y. Laws 403, § 3. 
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in their decisions.8 Section 2525.7 of the Rent Stabilization Code 
states: 
The rental amount that a tenant may charge a person in 
occupancy pursuant to section 235-f of the Real Property 
Law shall not exceed such occupant’s proportionate share 
of the legal regulated rent charged to and paid by the 
tenant for the subject housing accommodation. For the 
purposes of this subdivision, an occupant’s share shall be 
determined by dividing the legal regulated rent by the 
total number of tenants named on the lease and the total 
number of occupants residing in the subject housing 
accommodation. However, the total number of tenants 
named on the lease shall not include a tenant’s spouse, 
and the total number of occupants shall not include a 
tenant’s family member or an occupant’s dependent child. 
Regardless of the number of occupants, tenants named on 
the lease shall remain responsible for payment to the 
owner of the entire legal regulated rent. The charging of a 
rental amount to an occupant that exceeds that occupant’s 
proportionate share shall be deemed to constitute a 
violation of this Code.9 
The New York State Legislature last expressed its stance on 
the tenant-roommate relationship in 1983 with the enactment of 
the Omnibus Housing Act, which amended several statutes 
governing rental housing.10 In its legislative findings it stated that 
in order to protect those households in which unrelated 
roommates live together “for reasons of economy, safety and 
companionship,” it had become necessary to declare a tenant’s 
right to have a roommate.11 Based on this finding of necessity, 
                                                          
8 See infra Part I (detailing the history of New York City’s treatment of 
the tenant-roommate relationship). 
9 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2525.7(b) (2001). Section (a) 
reads, “Housing accommodations subject to the RSL and this Code may be 
occupied in accordance with the provisions and subject to the limitations of 
section 235-f of the Real Property Law.” Id. § 2525.7(a). 
10 Omnibus Housing Act, 1983 N.Y. Laws 403. 
11 Id. § 1 (stating “that unless corrective action is taken by the legislature, 
thousands of households throughout this state composed of unrelated persons 
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the legislature enacted section 235-f of the Real Property Law 
which states in part: 
2. It shall be unlawful for a landlord to restrict occupancy 
of residential premises, by express lease terms or 
otherwise, to a tenant or tenants or to such tenants and 
immediate family. Any such restriction in a lease or rental 
agreement entered into or renewed before or after the 
effective date of this section shall be unenforceable as 
against public policy. 
3. Any lease or rental agreement for residential premises 
entered into by one tenant shall be construed to permit 
occupancy by the tenant, immediate family of the tenant, 
one additional occupant, and dependent children of the 
occupant provided that the tenant or the tenant’s spouse 
occupies the premises as his primary residence.12 
This provision was intended to overrule a court of appeals 
decision in which the court found that a lease restricting 
occupancy to the tenant and her immediate family did not violate 
the State Human Rights Law or New York City Human Rights 
Law, which prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital 
status.13 
                                                          
who live together for reasons of economy, safety and companionship may be 
placed in jeopardy”). 
12 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-f (McKinney 2001). 
13 Hudson View Prop. v. Weiss, 450 N.E.2d 234, 235 (N.Y. 1983) 
(reasoning that the landlord had “not discriminated against the tenant in 
violation of [s]tate or city Human Rights Law” because the eviction was 
triggered “not because the tenant is unmarried, but because the lease restricts 
occupancy of her apartment, as are all apartments in the building, to the tenant 
and the tenant’s immediate family”). 
 See Omnibus Housing Act (Memorandum of Senator John B. Daly), 1983 
N.Y. Laws 403. See also id. § 1 (declaring “that recent judicial decisions 
refusing to extend the protection of the human rights laws to unrelated persons 
sharing a dwelling place will exacerbate this serious problem”). These 
memoranda refer to Hudson View Properties, 450 N.E.2d 234, which cited 
both the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-5(a) 
(McKinney 2001), cited in Hudson View Prop., 450 N.E.2d at 235, and the 
New York City Human Rights Law, Administrative Code of City of New 
York § B1-7.0-5(a), cited in Hudson View Prop., 450 N.E.2d at 235. 
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At the same time, the legislature enacted separate findings 
and prohibitions with regard to a tenant subletting to another 
person during her absence from the premises.14 Finding that 
“speculative and profiteering practices on the part of certain 
holders of apartment leases [were] leaving many subtenants 
without protection and removing many housing accommodations 
from the normal open market,”15 the legislature included in the 
Omnibus Housing Act an amendment to the Rent Stabilization 
Law regulating subletting.16 This amendment limited the amount 
of time a tenant could sublet a regulated apartment in New York 
City to a period of two years and the rent at which a tenant could 
sublet to the amount charged by the landlord plus 10% for 
furnishings.17 Examining these two provisions clearly shows that 
the legislature treated the acts of taking in roommates and 
subletting differently. 
Since the changes were enacted, the courts have reinforced 
the distinctions laid out in the law between subletting and taking 
in roommates. In 520 East 81st St. Associates v. Roughton-
Hester, the appellate division held that, in contrast to 
overcharging a sublettor, overcharging a roommate was not a 
proper cause for eviction and dismissed a petition for eviction on 
those grounds.18 The court pointed to the legislature’s clear intent 
                                                          
14 Omnibus Housing Act, 1983 N.Y. Laws 403. 
15 Id. § 1. 
16 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-511(c)(12) (McKinney 2001). 
17 Id. The amendment states that the regulation: 
 [P]ermits subletting of units subject to this law pursuant to section 
two hundred twenty-six-b of the real property law provided that (a) 
the rental charged to the subtenant does not exceed the stabilized rent 
plus a ten percent surcharge payable to the tenant if the unit sublet 
was furnished with the tenant’s furniture; (b) the tenant can establish 
that at all times he or she has maintained the unit as his or her 
primary residence and intends to occupy it as such at the expiration of 
the sublease . . . (f) the tenant may not sublet the unit for more than a 
total of two years, including the term of the proposed sublease, out of 
the four-year period preceding the termination date of the proposed 
sublease. 
Id. 
18 520 East 81st St. Assocs. v. Roughton-Hester, 555 N.Y.S.2d 70, 73 
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to differentiate a sublease from a tenant-roommate arrangement 
when regulating tenants’ actions.19 It also reasoned that, “many 
‘roommates’ are not strangers but individuals who choose to live 
together, apportioning costs according to their respective 
financial abilities, and other considerations.”20 The court in 
Roughton-Hester also based its decision on the fact that there was 
no law explicitly governing the rent a tenant charges her 
roommate.21 
The reasoning behind Roughton-Hester holds strong today. 
While DHCR has promulgated the proportionality provision since 
Roughton-Hester was decided in 1990, it is only a regulatory 
provision.22 In fact, there is still no legislatively enacted law 
governing rent between tenants and roommates in New York 
City.23 As a result, tenants and tenant organizations have argued 
convincingly that DHCR had no legislative grounding when it 
passed the proportionality provision and that it overstepped its 
authority.24 
                                                          
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1990) (holding that “neither the lease nor any law 
governing rent stabilized apartments permit a landlord to evict a tenant for 
earning a profit from the rent charged a roommate”); see also Handwerker v. 
Ensley, 690 N.Y.S.2d 54 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999) (denying injunction 
against a nonpayment proceeding when the roommate had requested the 
injunction on the theory that he was being overcharged). 
19 Roughton-Hester, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 72 (stating that “[t]he Legislature 
enacted separate provisions pertaining to subtenants and roommates and 
specifically indicated its intention to eliminate profiteering in subleases while 
remaining silent as to such practices committed by a tenant vis-a-vis a 
roommate”). 
20 Id. at 73. 
21 Id. at 72. 
22 RAM 1 LLC v. Mazzola, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 2001, at 21:1 (Civ. Ct.), 
aff’d & remanded, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829 (Sup. App. Term. 1st 
Dep’t Dec. 28, 2001). The court in RAM 1 LLC v. Mazzola cites the existence 
of a new proportionality provision as its reason for distinguishing Roughton-
Hester. Id. 
23 See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text (recounting the history of 
lawmaking around roommates and sublettors). 
24 See, e.g., Petitioners-Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Petition at 19-21, Brooklyn Hous. & Family Serv. v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Hous. and Cmty. Renewal, No. 14191/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 
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The “Findings and Declaration of Emergency” introducing 
New York City’s Rent Stabilization Law states that one of this 
law’s purposes is “to forestall profiteering, speculation, and other 
disruptive practices tending to produce threats to the public 
health.”25 When enacting the limitations on subletting covered 
under the Omnibus Housing Act of 1983, the legislature 
reaffirmed its goal of protecting all tenants against profiteering 
by expressing this intent in its legislative findings,26 and by 
providing subtenants with the remedy of treble damages against 
an overcharging tenant.27 Moreover, when a tenant overcharges 
her subtenants and the landlord has constructive knowledge that 
the tenant holds only an “illusory tenancy”28 because she has 
                                                          
2001). One consortium of tenants and tenant advocates challenging this and 
other provisions promulgated by DHCR argue that DHCR was given a limited 
grant of authority by the legislature, citing Rent Stabilization Law section 26-
511(c) as stating, “A code shall not be adopted hereunder unless it appears to 
the division of housing and community renewal that such code (1) provides 
safeguards against unreasonably high rent increases and, in general, protects 
tenants and the public interest.” N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-511(c) 
(McKinney 2001). Citing such cases as Matter of Jones v. Berman, 332 
N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. 1976), and Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v. Gliedman, 
443 N.E.2d 940 (N.Y. 1982), they assert that the New York Court of Appeals 
holds that promulgations beyond the authority of an agency are invalid. 
Petitioners-Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition at 19-21. 
See also Appellant’s Opening Brief at 9-11, RAM 1 LLC v. Mazzola, No. 01-
294, 2001 WL 1682829 (Sup. App. Term. 1st Dep’t Dec. 28, 2001) (No. 
72479/01). These arguments are supported by the well-established ultra vires 
doctrine, summarized as follows: 
 [T]he basic doctrine of administrative law . . . is the doctrine of ultra 
vires. The jurisdictional principle is the root principle of 
administrative power. The statute is the source of agency authority as 
well as of its limits. If an agency act is within the statutory limits (or 
vires), its action is valid; if it is outside them (or ultra vires), it is 
invalid. No statute is needed to establish this; it is inherent in the 
constitutional positions of agencies and courts. 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 171 (3d ed. 1991). 
25 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-501 (McKinney 2001). 
26 See supra text accompanying note 15 (quoting the legislative findings). 
27 § 26-511(c)(12). 
28 Primrose v. Donahoe, 676 N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 
DICKMACRO4-29.DOC 7/16/02 2:28 PM 
546 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
been absent from the premises for more than two years, the 
courts have crafted their decisions to protect the subtenant.29 
They have found that the subtenant has the right to the tenancy.30 
The proportionality provision, on the other hand, contains no 
such remedy that evinces the purpose of protecting roommates 
against profiteering.31 The language of the provision is entirely 
silent as to the remedy for a roommate overcharge.32 
Even without looking at the underlying Rent Stabilization 
Law, the code itself does not allow for eviction under its new 
proportionality provision. The code states that, “[a]s long as the 
tenant continues to pay the rent to which the owner is entitled, no 
tenant shall be denied a renewal lease or removed from any 
housing accommodation . . . except on one or more grounds 
specified in this Code.”33 Unless prior approval of DHCR has 
been obtained, an action to recover possession of a rent-stabilized 
unit based on wrongful acts of the tenant may only be 
commenced based on one of the grounds listed in section 2524.3 
of the code.34 Roommate overcharge is not listed as one of the 
                                                          
1998) (defining an “illusory tenancy” as one where “the rent laws have been 
violated in a way that has permitted the prime tenant to ‘rent . . . [the 
apartment] for the purpose of subleasing for profit or otherwise depriving the 
subtenant of rights under the Rent Stabilization Law’” (quoting Avon 
Furniture Leasing v. Popolizio, 500 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1022 (App. Div. 1st 
Dep’t 1986))). 
29 Id. (defeating a holdover proceeding against the sublettors and re-
assigning the tenancy to them after the primary illusory tenants had moved 
out). 
30 Id. See also Skeeter v. Clark, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 23, 2001, at 20:3 (Civ. 
Ct.) (defeating a holdover proceeding against the sublettor and re-assigning the 
tenancy to her despite lacking the landlord’s permission to succeed to the 
tenancy). 
31 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting the language of the 
proportionality provision). 
32 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting the language of the 
proportionality provision). 
33 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2524.1(a) (2001), cited in 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-2, Kips Bay 
LLC v. Feinberg, No. 96915/01 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 2001). 
34 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2524.3 (2001). These grounds 
include failure to cure a substantial violation of the lease, creation of a 
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grounds for eviction.35 In fact, DHCR’s own general counsel 
stated that the provision was never meant to provide a new cause 
for eviction.36 Thus, the code mandates that the proportionality 
provision cannot serve as grounds for eviction. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the language of the provision does 
not specify a remedy has led to confusion. The first and only case 
decided under this new provision, RAM I LLC v. Mazzola, read 
the remedy of eviction of the entire household into the 
proportionality provision.37 This case concerned an eviction 
action brought by a landlord against a tenant who charged her 
roommate almost $300 per month above the rent for the entire 
apartment for the rental of one bedroom.38 In this decision, Judge 
Schachner denied a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause 
of action reasoning that the proportionality provision provides a 
cause for eviction when a tenant charges her roommate more than 
her proportionate share of the rent.39 The court distinguished 
                                                          
nuisance in the building, substantial damage to the building, harassment of the 
landlord or other tenants, use of the unit for illegal activities, refusal to allow 
the landlord necessary access, refusal to renew an expired lease, and violation 
of the limits on subletting. Id. 
35 Id. It should be noted that a tenant earning money from her apartment 
is not in substantial breach of her lease. In order for business use to be a 
substantial breach of a residential lease, and therefore grounds for eviction 
under § 2524.3, the use “must materially affect the character of the building, 
materially damage or burden the property or materially disturb the other 
tenants.” Haberman v. Gotbaum, 698 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410 (Civ. Ct. 1999). 
Activities that have been allowed under this standard include a private art 
studio, Haberman, 698 N.Y.S.2d 406, a private office, Nissen v. Wang, 431 
N.Y.S.2d 984 (Civ. Ct. 1980), and a family childcare facility, Sorkin v. 
Cross, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 24, 1996, at 27:3 (Civ. Ct.). 
36 Live at Five (WNBC-TV broadcast June 5, 2001). See also Affidavit of 
Marcia Hirsch, DHCR General Counsel, In Support of Response at ¶ 282, 
Brooklyn Hous. & Family Services v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. and Cmty. 
Renewal, No. 14191/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 2001) (stating that 
“DHCR’s interpretation of § 2525.7 is that it vests roommates with the right 
to file a complaint against the tenant rather than create a new cause of action 
for eviction”) [hereinafter Hirsch Affidavit]. 
37 Mazzola, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829, at *1. 
38 Id. 
39 Mazzola, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 2001, at 21:1, aff’d & remanded, No. 01-
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Roughton-Hester on the grounds that the proportionality 
provision was not in existence at the time of that decision.40 The 
petition upheld by the court read, in part, that “[t]he serious 
nature of this violation, charging a roommate a monthly sum in 
excess of the entire monthly rent for the whole apartment, 
constitutes illegal profiteering and as such, does not lend itself to, 
nor is it susceptible of cure.”41 While the succinctness of the 
housing court’s decision obscures its reasoning to some extent, 
the court appears to have accepted this landlord’s characterization 
of Ms. Mazzola’s actions as “profiteering” to not only find a 
cause for eviction that is not explicitly provided in the provision, 
but also to find that cause for eviction incurable.42 
II. THE PROPORTIONALITY PROVISION’S FAILURES 
The main flaws in the proportionality provision as it now 
stands, and as it has been applied, are twofold. First, it places the 
remedy in the wrong hands.43 Rather than giving the roommate a 
                                                          
294, 2001 WL 1682829 (holding that “[g]iven the language of Section 
2525.7(b) of the Rent Stabilization Code, . . . respondent’s motion to dismiss 
the petition is denied”). 
40 Id. (stating erroneously, “Roughton-Hester even mentions that at the 
time there was no law governing rent stabilized tenants which dealt with the 
issue of a tenant who earns a profit from a roommate. With the recent 
amendment this is no longer true”). 
41 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8, RAM 1 LLC v. Mazzola, No. 01-294, 
2001 WL 1682829 (Sup. App. Term. 1st Dep’t Dec. 28, 2001) (No. 
72479/01) (quoting Petitioner’s opening brief). 
42 Mazzola, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 2001, at 21:1, aff’d & remanded, No. 01-
294, 2001 WL 1682829, at *1. See also Jay Romano, Your Home: Roommate 
Overcharges Risk Lease, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, § 11, at 5. 
 DHCR has responded to this decision by taking a step back, see quotation 
by Marcia Hirsch, supra note 36, but qualified its denunciation of the decision 
so that its stance is somewhat unclear: “[h]owever, it should be noted that 
Ram I LLC presents the kind of egregious situation where the roommate paid 
not only more than her proportionate share but more than the tenant was 
paying.” Hirsch Affidavit, supra note 36, at ¶ 282. 
43 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2522.1, 2526.1 
(2001) (giving overcharged tenants a right to reimbursement with interest from 
their landlords); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-511(c)(12) (McKinney 2001) 
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claim for reimbursement against the primary tenant, it gives the 
landlord a cause for eviction of the entire unit, including the 
roommate.44 Second, it provides no exemptions for justified 
disproportionalities.45 Given the current housing market, low-
income tenants are justified in charging their roommates greater 
than proportionate rents when needed in order to sustain their 
tenancies.46 An examination of four major schools of thought on 
the justifications behind rent regulation enlightens this analysis: 
the redistribution of wealth, the preservation of stable 
communities, the protection of the “personhood” interest that a 
tenant holds in her home, and the maintenance of a fair market 
free from speculation and profiteering.47 An application of these 
theories to the problem of roommate relations reaffirms the ways 
in which the proportionality provision is flawed in its design and 
recent interpretation. 
A. The Remedy Must Not Lie with the Landlord 
By construing the proportionality provision as providing a 
just cause for eviction, the Mazzola court gave the remedy for an 
overcharge to the wrong party.48 Under Mazzola, landlords stand 
to profit from the discovery of a roommate overcharge, while 
                                                          
(giving overcharged subtenants a right to treble damages from their primary 
tenants). 
44 Mazzola, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829. But see supra note 36 
(quoting DHCR as denying intent to be used as a cause for eviction). 
45 See infra Part II.B. 
46 See infra Part II.B.1 (describing the current economic straits of New 
York City tenants in relation to rent levels). 
47 See Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, in PERSPECTIVES 
ON PROPERTY LAW 410 (Robert C. Ellison et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995) 
(summarizing and comparing the first three justifications); Timothy L. 
Collins, “Fair Rents” or “Forced Subsidies” Under Rent Regulation: Finding 
a Regulatory Taking Where Legal Fictions Collide, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1293 
(1996) (summarizing the fair market objective). See infra Part II.A (discussing 
the relevance of the redistribution of wealth and community preservation 
theories to the proportionality provision); Part II.B (discussing the relevance 
of the fair market objective and personhood interest theories). 
48 Mazzola, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829. 
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roommates are given no remedy and ultimately face eviction 
themselves upon the discovery of their “disproportionate” rent 
burden.49 Because this provision only benefits landlords at the 
expense of tenants and their roommates, the proportionality 
provision cannot find its justification in statutory enactments 
intended to protect tenants from profiteering.50 
The sentiment voiced by the court in Mazzola, that a tenant 
who overcharges a roommate wrongly profiteers off of her 
landlord’s assets, is one that is echoed by the media.51 The 
Mazzola court’s recognition of a cause for eviction in roommate 
overcharging received significant media attention—presented to 
the public both as the justifiable curtailment of a tenant’s “profit 
center”52 and, in contrast, as the opportunism of a landlord at the 
expense of a disabled old lady.53 One article reported that the 
tenant, Ms. Mazzola, owned a second house in Westport 
Connecticut worth $490,000 to $640,000 that was yielding 
$33,000 per year in rental income.54 At the same time, the article 
stated, the landlord was deprived of the $10,000 monthly market 
                                                          
49 Id. The bias in this placement of the remedy is particularly transparent 
given that the penalty that a landlord faces for overcharging a tenant is mere 
reimbursement of the tenant with interest. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 
9, § 2526.1 (2001). 
50 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (quoting the purposes of the 
Rent Stabilization Law). Clearly, § 235-f of the Real Property Law also fails 
to provide the justification needed by DHCR to restrict a tenant’s right to take 
in roommates upon penalty of immediate eviction. The court of appeals has 
emphatically affirmed that “it is undeniable that this section was passed to 
protect tenants and occupants, not landlords.” Capital Holding Co. v. 
Stravrolakes, 662 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15-16 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1997), aff’d, 707 
N.E.2d 432 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that § 235-f does not create a cause for 
eviction in the taking in of more than one unrelated roommate), cited in 
Petitioners-Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 24, at 56. 
51 See, e.g., John Tierney, A Room and a View (Libertarian), N.Y. 
TIMES, June 12, 2001, at B1 (asking, “Does Joan E. Mazzola deserve to join 
the list of New York’s 10 Worst Tenants?”). 
52 Id. 
53 Bruce Lambert, Rule Limits Overcharging of Roommates, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 5, 2001, at B1. 
54 Tierney, supra note 51, at B1. 
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rent potential of this Park Avenue apartment because Ms. 
Mazzola was paying the stabilized rent of $1,847.77 per month.55 
This argument, that tenants who are not properly using their 
tenancies wrongly deprive landlords of the market rent for those 
years of tenancy, can be seen in other contexts as well.56 In 
Mazzola, this sentiment motivated the form that the remedy 
took—eviction.57 However, placing the remedy for roommate 
overcharge in the hands of the landlord is neither justified, 
because it is the roommate whom the provision seeks to protect, 
nor wise, given the repercussions.58 
                                                          
55 Id. But see infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (presenting 
mitigating facts and conflicting stories as to Ms. Mazzola’s resources and 
roommate arrangement). 
56 See, e.g., John Chipman, Bogus NYC Tenant Sued for $5M: Lived 30 
Years in Flat Leased to Friend at Bargain Rate, NAT’L POST, Aug. 24, 2001, 
at A11. The story tells of a landlord who recently sued a tenant who had been 
living under the leaseholder’s name for more than thirty-five years. His claim 
for $5 million, the difference between the tenant’s rent and lucrative market 
rents in the neighborhood, has not yet been decided. Id. Despite the fact that 
the occupant had not been trying to hide his identity, paying rent directly to 
the landlord, the judge saw the tenant as exploitive: “[he] has received a 
largesse for an extremely long time by paying an artificially low rent in a 
highly desirable neighborhood.” Id. 
57 Mazzola, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829, at *1. 
58 A quick analysis of the government takings doctrine demonstrates that 
the placement of the remedy in the hands of the roommate rather than the 
landlord constitutes neither a physical taking nor a regulatory taking in the 
context of the New York City housing market. U.S. CONST. amend. V, 
amend. XIV. 
 In Yee v. City of Escondido, the Supreme Court found that a per se 
physical taking was not made when city regulations over mobile home parks 
placed limits on rents, required good cause for eviction, and allowed renters of 
mobile home sites (or “pods”) to sell their homes and transfer their tenancies 
to another person. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1992). 
The Court found that the determining fact was that the mobile home park 
owners had “voluntarily rented their land to mobile home owners.” Id. at 527. 
Likewise, New York City rent stabilized landlords enter the business 
voluntarily and, like in Yee, have a regulatory means of leaving the business. 
Id. at 527-28; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2524.5(a)(1) (2001). 
The fact that the ordinance in Yee allowed a transfer of wealth from park 
owners to their mobile home tenants, through the sales premium which mobile 
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home owners stood to receive by selling their right to a regulated tenancy, did 
not make for a physical taking. Yee, 503 U.S. at 529-30. This is suggestive of 
the argument that to allow tenants to overcharge their roommates constitutes a 
per se taking by transferring profits. That argument is clearly defeated by Yee. 
The Yee Court, however, did not decide whether such regulation constituted a 
regulatory taking. Id. at 538. 
 Regulation of private property constitutes a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment takings clause through the Fourteenth Amendment as a regulatory 
taking “if it denies an owner economically viable use of the property (a per se 
regulatory taking), or if it does not substantially advance legitimate State 
interests.” Rent Stabilization Assoc. of New York City v. Higgins, 630 
N.E.2d 626, 83 N.Y.2d 156, 173 (1993). Landlords’ profits are in no way 
extinguished by rent stabilization in New York City. According to a Rent 
Guidelines Board report, the New York City agency that annually sets 
maximum stabilized rent increases, the average rent-stabilized landlord made a 
net income (excluding income tax and debt service) of $177,000 per building 
in 1999. RENT GUIDELINES BOARD, 2001 INCOME AND EXPENSE STUDy 8, 
available at http://www.housingnyc.com (Apr. 10, 2001). 
 The courts have found that a regulation advances a legitimate state 
interest, except in situations where they cannot find a close causal nexus 
between the property being regulated and the stated purposes of the regulation. 
See, e.g., Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 
1989) (finding that a city ordinance requiring residential hotel owners to 
renovate and rent out their units at regulated rates rather than to demolish or 
convert them was not closely related to the purpose of alleviating 
homelessness, because the rooms would not be limited to formerly homeless 
or potentially homeless individuals), cited in Collins, supra note 47, at 1297. 
As explained below, one of the principal purposes of the New York City rent 
regulation system is to protect tenants against an unfair housing market of 
scarcity and unnaturally high rents. As Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out in 
Pennell v. City of San Jose, “When commodities have been priced at a level 
that produces exorbitant returns, the owners of those commodities can be 
viewed as responsible for the economic hardship that occurs.” Pennell v. City 
of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) (concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(arguing, however, that the rent ordinance clause at issue was an 
unconstitutional taking because any exorbitant returns would be curtailed by 
other parts of the ordinance), cited in Collins, supra note 47, at 1304. Thus, 
the fair market objective constitutes the necessary causal nexus between the 
protection of tenants and the regulation of landlords. Id., cited in Collins, 
supra note 47, at 1304. This same reasoning supports giving the remedy for a 
roommate overcharge to the roommate rather than the landlord. As argued in 
greater detail below, because current rent levels are governed more by scarcity 
and market forces than by regulation, allowing tenants to charge their 
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Because of the multitude of shared living situations among 
rent stabilized tenants, landlords may have great latitude in 
choosing who to evict under the proportionality provision, and 
can do so based on what they stand to gain from the eviction.59 In 
fact, landlords stand to gain a considerable sum due to the 
recently enacted vacancy allowance of 20%.60 They can bring an 
eviction under the proportionality provision even when a 
roommate is satisfied with her rental arrangement.61 
Many disproportionate roommate arrangements are voluntary 
and negotiated in the context of a personal relationship.62 For this 
reason, unmarried couples, particularly gay and lesbian couples, 
will be disparately impacted by the proportionality provision.63 
Like married couples, many unmarried couples divide rent and 
                                                          
roommates “disproportionate” rents in some circumstances must be allowed in 
order to protect tenants from those market forces. See infra Part II.B.1. 
59 See Lambert, supra note 53, at B1. As many as 15.8% of rent 
stabilized tenants have roommates. One source cites 8.3% of rent stabilized 
tenants according to the 2000 Census, equaling approximately 83,000. 
Affidavit of John Seley in Support of Petition, Brooklyn Hous. & Family 
Services v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. and Cmty. Renewal, No. 14191/01 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 2001). Another source cites 158,238 rent-
stabilized tenants in 1999, Lambert, supra note 53, at B1, which would seem 
to equal approximately 15.8% of the group. 
60 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-511(c)(5-a) (McKinney 2001). For two-
year leases after a vacancy, a landlord can increase the monthly rent by 20%. 
The formula is a little more complicated for one-year leases that follow a 
vacancy. Id. The fact that a 20% increase above a low-rent unit may not be 
considerable is made up for by two additional allowances. First, a landlord 
who had a long-term tenant and was unable to collect a vacancy allowance 
within the last eight years is allowed upon termination of that tenancy to 
collect a 0.6% increase for each year since the last vacancy allowance. Id. 
Second, upon the vacancy of a unit that was renting for $300 to $500 per 
month, the landlord can increase the rent by $100. Id. 
61 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting statutory language). 
62 See supra note 20 and accompanying text (quoting the Roughton-Hester 
court’s finding on the personal nature of roommate arrangements). 
63 See Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae LAMBDA Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, Inc. in Support of Petitioners-Plaintiffs, Brooklyn Hous. 
& Family Services v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. and Cmty. Renewal, No. 
14191/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 2001) [hereinafter LAMBDA Memo]. 
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other living expenses according to who is best able to pay them, 
or for other personal reasons.64 Unlike married couples, 
however, unmarried couples who live in apartments where only 
one partner’s name is on the lease, and where the unnamed 
partner pays the greater portion of the rent, will have the burden 
of proving that they are family if they are to defend against an 
eviction action alleging a violation of the proportionality 
provision.65 That burden is likely to be a significant one, 
requiring the help of a lawyer and disclosure of intimate details 
of the couple’s relationship.66 
Giving landlords the benefit of a roommate overcharge action 
                                                          
64 Id. at 5-6. 
65 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-f(1)(b) (McKinney 2001) (defining 
an “occupant,” as referred to in the proportionality provision, as “a person, 
other than a tenant or a member of a tenant’s immediate family, occupying a 
premises with the consent of the tenant or tenants”), cited in LAMBDA 
Memo, supra note 63, at 5. 
66 LAMBDA Memo, supra note 63, at 6-11. The legislature has 
constructed a definition of family in relation to succession rights that was 
meant to incorporate same-sex couples. Rent Regulation Reform Act, 1997 
N.Y. Laws 116, § 21; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.6(o)(2) 
(2001). The new definition of family calls for an examination of “emotional 
and financial commitment” evidenced by such factors as longevity of the 
relationship, sharing of expenses, intermingling of finances, jointly attending 
family functions and celebrations, formalizing legal obligations, holding 
themselves out to the public as family members, regularly performing family 
functions, and other evidence evincing “the intention of creating a long-term, 
emotionally-committed relationship.” Id. That definition has also been found 
to apply to other contexts. LAMBDA Memo, supra note 63, at 6. However, 
the burden of demonstrating that a relationship qualifies under this definition 
can be overwhelming and intrusive. See, e.g., Classic Properties, L.P. v. 
Martinez, 646 N.Y.S.2d 755, 755-56 (App. Term 1st Dep’t 1996), cited in 
LAMBDA Memo, supra note 63, at 11 (offering photographs, intimate 
correspondence, and affidavits as proof of a twenty-four year relationship); 
Strassman v. Estate of Eggena, 582 N.Y.S.2d 899 (App. Term 1st Dep’t 
1992), cited in LAMBDA Memo, supra note 63, at 11 (involving two-and-a-
half years of litigation). Statutory family status may be even harder to prove in 
the context of the proportionality provision than in the context of succession 
rights, because those couples defending against this sort of eviction are less 
likely to be long-term couples with intermingling finances. LAMBDA Memo, 
supra note 63, at 13. 
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also gives them reason to harass their tenants and a tool by which 
to do so.67 This harassment may cause a tenant tremendous stress, 
and may cause her to move even without the process of an 
eviction proceeding.68 Disproportionate rents are not always easy 
to prove without the cooperation of the roommate.69 Because 
tenants can conceal rent-sharing arrangements by paying with one 
check, a landlord may have to use creative means of finding out a 
roommate’s rent when attempting an eviction.70 Many of these 
means may border on harassment. The New York Apartment Law 
Insider, for example, advises landlords to hire a private 
investigator and to collude with the roommate.71 One landlord 
attempted to investigate by sending a letter that failed to allege 
any evidence of disproportionate rent charges, but still demanded 
that the tenant “account to this office for any and all sums 
collected by you from roommates.”72 It is unclear whether the 
Mazzola court’s interpretation of the proportionality provision 
gives landlords the right to demand information on roommate 
arrangements.73 
Even without these practical infirmities, the theoretical 
approaches to rent regulation would reject the placement of the 
remedy in the hands of landlords. Proponents of the 
                                                          
67 See G. Samuel Zucker, Note, Insurance for Eviction Without Cause: A 
Middle Path for Tenant Tenure Rights and a New Remedy, 28 URB. LAW. 
113, 129 (1996). 
68 Id. 
69 See Court OKs Eviction of Tenant Who Overcharges Roommate, N.Y. 
APARTMENT L. INSIDER, Aug. 2001, at 11 [hereinafter Court OKs Eviction] 
(stating that “[i]t’s not always easy to find out whether a tenant is 
overcharging a roommate”). 
70 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2525.7(b) (2001) (stating that 
“[r]egardless of the number of occupants, tenants named on the lease shall 
remain responsible for payment to the owner of the entire legal regulated 
rent”). 
71 Court OKs Eviction, supra note 69, at 11. 
72 Exhibit A, Affidavit of Sara Jane Swanson in Support of Petition, 
Brooklyn Hous. & Family Services v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. and Cmty. 
Renewal, No. 14191/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 2001). 
73 See infra note 171 (discussing the repercussions of such an 
interpretation). 
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redistribution of wealth theory defend a tenant’s use of a 
landlord’s assets to her own gain.74 If a housing market is subject 
to high demand and low supply, landlords will make high 
economic rents (rents above a rate of return that is considered 
reasonable on an average investment).75 Under such 
circumstances, rent control and stabilization will cause a transfer 
of wealth from the landlord to the tenants without an 
accompanying decrease in supply that comes from lowering rents 
to below a reasonable rate of return.76 The current New York 
City housing market provides high economic rents and, even 
under rent stabilization, provides substantial profits.77 According 
to this approach, because wealth should be more equally 
apportioned and because most tenants are poorer than their 
landlords, rent regulation is a justified means to that end.78 
                                                          
74 Radin, supra note 47, at 412 (attributing this standpoint to “‘pure’ 
welfare economists”). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. (positing that there is no “allocative inefficiency” when “landlords 
have high economic rents, so that rent control causes a ‘mere’ wealth transfer 
from landlords to tenants”). 
77 INCOME AND EXPENSE STUDY, supra note 58, at 8. According to a 
report by the Rent Guidelines Board, the New York City agency that annually 
sets maximum stabilized rent increases, the average rent stabilized landlord 
made a net income (excluding income tax and debt service) of $177,000 per 
building in 1999. Id. “As operating costs have consumed less revenue in 
recent years, inflation–adjusted [net operating income] in 1999 was nearly 
18% more than the average found in 1989.” Id. See also OFFICE OF THE 
PUBLIC ADVOCATE, RENT DESTABILIZATION STUDY II: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
FAIRNESS TO LANDLORDS OF RENT INCREASES GRANTED BY THE RENT 
GUIDELINES BOARD FOR STABILIZED APARTMENTS 4, available at http://www. 
housingnyc.com (May 18, 1997) [hereinafter RENT DESTABILIZATION STUDY]. 
78 For those people who do not believe that the landlord’s “search for 
profits is no different from that of other providers of goods and services,” as 
Irving Welferd believes, redistribution of wealth through the housing market 
seems particularly appropriate. See Irving Welferd, Poor Tenants, Poor 
Landlords, Poor Policy, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 374, 374 
(Robert C. Ellison et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995). Disbelief in such a sentiment may 
be fueled, for example, by the recognition that rents are mostly returns on an 
investment rather than earnings from work. See ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE 
WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 96, 188 (6th ed. 1992) (attributing this critique to 
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Likewise, because the tenant is often the party in need of greater 
wealth, the rent regulation scheme cannot justly be used to 
prevent a tenant from “profiteering” off of the landlord’s assets 
by renting out part of her apartment at a profit.79 Thus, regulation 
of the tenant-roommate relationship must not focus on the 
landlord’s welfare. 
There are flaws with the wealth redistribution justification.80 
Because New York City’s rent stabilization is available to all but 
the wealthiest tenants, this redistribution is not directed at those 
who need it most.81 Redistribution of wealth has not been the 
primary impetus behind New York City’s rent regulation 
scheme.82 A more sensible scheme, under this reasoning, would 
give the lowest-income tenants the greatest benefits.83 Moreover, 
arguably not all landlords are wealthy. Some struggle to get by 
and are nevertheless subject to the same rent regulation scheme 
as those landlords who are making significant profits.84 
                                                          
the economic philosophers David Ricardo and Henry George); INCOME AND 
EXPENSE STUDY, supra note 58, at 2, 6 (reporting that out of the average unit 
rent of $706, arguably only $220 goes to some sort of landlord “work”—i.e., 
labor, maintenance, and administration costs combined). It may also reflect a 
sense of injustice that tenants feel when paying rents that, because of tax 
favoritism for homeowners, are close to what those tenants would be paying in 
mortgage payments were they able to place a down payment on a house. 
Zucker, supra note 67, at 133. 
79 See Radin, supra note 47, at 412 (explaining that proponents of wealth 
redistribution are strictly concerned with the wealth transfer from landlords to 
tenants). 
80 See generally Collins, supra note 47 (arguing that viewing rent 
regulation as a subsidy could make it vulnerable to challenge under the takings 
doctrine). 
81 Zucker, supra note 67, at 124. 
82 See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text (documenting evidence 
of the fair rent objective throughout New York City’s rent regulation history). 
83 See Zucker, supra note 67, at 124. 
84 See, e.g., Welferd, supra note 78 (arguing that most landlords are 
small-scale operators earning small incomes off of low-income tenants). The 
New York City Rent Stabilization Code, however, allows for rent increases by 
reason of a landlord’s economic hardship in certain circumstances, such as 
when the landlord’s annual gross rents do not exceed her annual operating 
costs by at least 5%. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.4(c) 
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However, another approach, the community preservation 
theory, also confirms the error made by the Mazzola court in 
assigning the remedy to the landlord.85 The community 
preservation theory is based on the understanding that 
communities have value beyond the mere conveniences that they 
provide; communities play a strong part in shaping the identities 
of their members.86 Thus, communities are valuable to society 
and should be preserved.87 Using the community preservation 
theory to inform a solution to roommate overcharge supports the 
protection of both tenants and roommates. For example, a large 
group of those tenants who charge their roommates more than a 
“proportionate” share of the rent are likely to be senior citizens 
who have often lived in their units and in their communities for 
many years.88 On the other hand, roommates may also be long-
term residents; even new roommates may more likely be 
community members than new tenants because shared housing 
opportunities are generally advertised locally and informally, if at 
all.89 Thus, both parties need protection if the community is to be 
                                                          
(2001). See also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.4(b)(1) 
(2001). 
85 Radin, supra note 47, at 417-18. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 418 (stating that “[w]e suppose from our knowledge of life in this 
society that the personal utility attributable to living in an established close-
knit community is very high . . . [and] that personhood is fostered by living 
within an established community of other persons”). 
88 UNDER ONE ROOF: ISSUES AND INNOVATIONS IN SHARED HOUSING 11 
(George C. Hemmens et al. eds., SUNY Series in Urban Public Policy 1996) 
[hereinafter UNDER ONE ROOF]. 
89 See ZANY’S NEW YORK CITY APARTMENT SALES AND RENTAL GUIDE 
314-15 (Courtney Andrialis and Janet Beard eds., 2001 ed.) [hereinafter 
ZANY’S] (recommending word-of-mouth as the most effective means of 
finding a compatible roommate). Moreover, a 1999 study in New York City 
found that 42% of renters moving into low-rent apartments (renting for under 
$600 per month) learned of the apartment by word-of-mouth. RENT 
GUIDELINES BOARD, INCOME AND AFFORDABILITY BRIEF: HOW RECENT 
MOVERS FIND APARTMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2, available at http://www. 
housingnyc.com (Jan. 1999). While that study excluded roommate situations, 
this economical method of advertising arguably would be used just as 
frequently by tenants as by low-revenue landlords. Id. 
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preserved. While it is not clear which party the community 
preservation theory favors in the tenant-roommate relationship, it 
is clear from this approach that eviction of the entire household 
cannot be the proper remedy for a roommate overcharge. 
B. Exemptions Must Be Made Where Justified 
At the same time that one New York Times journalist 
portrayed Ms. Mazzola and her fellow tenants as profiteers, 
another reported conflicting facts and also brought to light the 
mitigating circumstances behind her actions.90 The article 
reported that Ms. Mazzola subsisted on only $12,000 per year 
and suffered from emphysema and heart ailments.91 Moreover, 
Ms. Mazzola provided her roommate with food, use of the 
common rooms, and daily maid service.92 
These contrasting media representations raise the question as 
to whether those tenants charging disproportionate rents should 
be differentiated based on their reasons for doing so—based on 
whether they are capitalists or little old ladies struggling to get 
by. Low-income tenants are more likely to be justified in 
charging their roommates disproportionate rents for several 
reasons. First, in today’s housing market low-income tenants 
need to take in roommates in order to subsist.93 Second, low-
                                                          
90 See, e.g., Lambert, supra note 53, at B1. 
91 Id. 
92 Live at Five (WNBC-TV broadcast June 5, 2001). 
93 See Affidavit of Jacqueline Burger in Support of Petition, Brooklyn 
Hous. & Family Services v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. and Cmty. Renewal, 
No. 14191/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 2001) [hereinafter Burger 
Affidavit]. Burger states the following: 
 A number of my clients can only afford to remain in their apartments 
by obtaining roommate [sic]. Among those clients is an elderly 
Holocaust survivor whose only source of income is less than $800.00 
per month from Social Security Retirement. Her rent is higher than 
her income. The only way she has been able to remain in an 
apartment she has occupied for over 30 years is by having a 
roommate who pays more than 50 percent of the rent. 
Id. at ¶ 7. See also Lambert, supra note 53, at B1. 
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income tenants face greater repercussions as a result of eviction.94 
Third, low-income tenants may be more likely to engage in 
informal exchanges that equalize a roommate arrangement but are 
not exempted by DHCR in its definition of “disproportionate” 
rents.95 And, finally, low-income tenants have less access to legal 
information and representation, and so are less capable of 
avoiding a disproportionate arrangement and of defending against 
an eviction on that basis.96 Therefore, a roommate overcharge 
provision that fails to recognize justifications for overcharging is 
unfair to those rent stabilized tenants who are the poorest.97 
1. Economic Need 
Because they cannot afford to pay even half of their monthly 
rent, many low-income rent stabilized tenants must take in a 
roommate at a disproportionate rent.98 Recent annual rent-
increase allowances for rent stabilized apartments have outpaced 
tenant household income increases.99 The New York City Rent 
Guidelines Board reports, “When looking at both rent costs and 
income, statistics indicate that it is increasingly difficult for those 
                                                          
94 See Ken Karas, Note, Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent 
Tenants in Eviction Proceedings in New York, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 527, 531 (1991) (stating that “[m]any tenants who are threatened with 
eviction risk not only losing their current homes, but also dislocation from 
their communities to the streets and shelters”). 
95 See UNDER ONE ROOF, supra note 88, at 10-11. 
96 See 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956, 958 (Civ. Ct. 
1992). 
97 See generally Karas, supra note 94, at 527-32. 
98 See Burger Affidavit, supra note 93; Lambert, supra note 53. See also 
RENT GUIDELINES BOARD, 2001 INCOME AND AFFORDABILITY STUDY 4, 6, 
available at http://www.housingnyc.com (Apr. 24, 2001) (reporting that 
higher rates of overcrowding in rent stabilized units demonstrate that economic 
need has forced rent stabilized tenants to take in roommates). 
99 Zucker, supra note 67, at 154 n.31. In the 1990s, New York City rents 
in general increased by 10.8% while tenants’ incomes rose by only 2.8%. In 
the late 1990s, the real median household income for rent stabilized tenants 
decreased 0.5%. J.A. Lobbia, The 8.7 Percent Solution, VILLAGE VOICE, 
May 22, 2001, at 26. 
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households with lower incomes to afford housing without some 
government assistance.”100 In 1997, the New York Supreme 
Court in Jiggetts v. Dowling found that the shelter allowance paid 
to recipients under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(“AFDC”) program in New York City “[did] not bear a 
reasonable relationship to the cost of housing in New York 
City,” and ordered that it be increased.101 The court based this 
finding on evidence of the scarcity of units renting within the 
shelter allowance and the prevalence of AFDC recipients renting 
at a level above their shelter allowance.102 Even though it has 
been two years since the court’s order to issue new subsidies was 
affirmed by the appellate division,103 the State Commissioner of 
Social Services has yet to do so.104 Thus, while the shelter 
allowance was unreasonable in 1987, when the Jiggetts suit was 
initiated, it is even more unreasonable today at the same level of 
$312 per month for a family of four.105 
Despite little to no increase in real income for tenants over 
the last decade, the Rent Guidelines Board has increased rents 
                                                          
100 INCOME AND AFFORDABILITY STUDY, supra note 98, at 4. 
101 Jiggetts v. Dowling, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 22, 1997, at 26:2 (Sup. Ct.), 
aff’d, 689 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999). In response to a motion 
to dismiss, this same court had found that New York State Social Services 
Law § 350(1)(a) imposes a mandatory duty on the State Commissioner to set 
adequate shelter allowances. Jiggetts v. Grinker, 528 N.Y.S.2d 462, 468 
(Sup. Ct. 1988), rev’d, 543 N.Y.S.2d 414 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1989), rev’d, 
553 N.E.2d 570 (N.Y. 1990), remanded to Jiggetts v. Dowling, N.Y.L.J., 
Apr. 22, 1997, at 26:2 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 689 N.Y.S.2d 482. The court also 
granted a preliminary injunction, which is still in effect today, ordering that 
AFDC recipients be paid rent arrears and future reasonable rents upon any 
eviction action for non-payment caused by the inadequate shelter allowance in 
order to prevent eviction. Id. 
102 Jiggetts v. Dowling, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 22, 1997, at 26:2. 
103 Jiggetts v. Dowling, 689 N.Y.S.2d 482. 
104 Cerisse Anderson, Four Years After ‘Jiggetts,’ State Has Yet to Raise 
Rent Allowance, N.Y.L.J., June 18, 2001, at 1:2. 
105 Id. (noting also that 25,000 families are receiving court-ordered 
enhanced interim shelter allowances in metropolitan New York in order to 
avoid eviction, which demonstrates that the shelter allowance level is not 
adequate). 
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steadily each year.106 The board’s annual decision is based 
principally on the price of goods and services that landlords 
purchase, often exaggerated by temporary spikes in fuel prices, 
inaccurate quotes by vendors, and embellished figures reported 
by the landlords themselves.107 In recent years, the Rent 
Guidelines Board has routinely granted landlords rent increases 
higher than the cost of operating indicated by the Commensurate 
Rent Increase formula.108 Legal methods of raising rents beyond 
those levels set by the Rent Guidelines Board include a 20% 
vacancy allowance,109 a vacant apartment renovation pass-
through,110 and a pass-through for building-wide major capital 
improvements (“MCIs”).111 Tenants have a remedy to rent 
overcharges, both in the form of illegal rent increases and illegal 
                                                          
106 Lobbia, supra note 99, at 26. 
107 Id. (reporting that “landlords’ actual costs are often less than the prices 
vendors quote to RGB researchers” as well as on the effects of temporary fuel 
spikes); INCOME AND EXPENSE STUDY, supra note 58, at 5 (stating that, 
according to audit results, reports by landlords are generally exaggerated by 
8%). 
108 According to a 1997 report, the Rent Guidelines Board had done this 
for eighteen of the preceding twenty-two years. RENT DESTABILIZATION 
STUDY, supra note 77, at 4-5. 
109 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-511(c)(5-a) (McKinney 2001). The fact 
that rent collections reported by rent stabilized landlords have increased by 
figures greater than that allowed by Rent Guidelines Board allowances 
demonstrates that landlords are taking advantage of these additional means of 
raising rents. INCOME AND EXPENSE STUDY, supra note 58, at 4. 
110 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.4(a)(1) (2001). When a 
unit is vacant, a landlord does not need any approval to make improvements to 
such things as kitchen and bathroom fixtures, doors, and windows and to 
increase the base monthly rent for that unit by one-fortieth of the cost of those 
improvements. Id. 
111 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.4(a)(2)(i) (2001). 
Entire apartment complexes can be affected by MCIs. For example, the owner 
of Peter Cooper Village on Manhattan’s East Side recently applied for a $44 
rent increase for each room of the 2,480 units to pay for rewiring all of the 
buildings. Many of the complex’s tenants are long-term elderly residents living 
on fixed incomes, for whom a $132 monthly increase (for a one-bedroom 
apartment) is a large burden. David Kirby, Tempers Flare over a Rent Rise at 
Peter Cooper Village, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2000, § 14, at 8. 
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initial rents, through a claim filed with DHCR.112 If an 
overcharge is found by DHCR in a hearing on the claim, DHCR 
will order the landlord to reimburse the tenant for the 
overcharged amount plus interest.113 Because of a backlog of 
claims at DHCR, however, rent overcharge claims are rarely 
addressed before a complaining tenant moves out of the 
apartment.114 This results in very few illegal rents being curbed 
and contributes to the phenomenon of rising rents in New York 
City.115 As a result, almost 48% of New York City tenants spend 
more than one-third of their income on rent, and 18% spend 
more than half of their income on rent.116 These current realities 
are the result of New York City’s narrow conception of rent 
regulation. Particularly of late, New York City’s rent regulation 
                                                          
112 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2522.1, 2526.1 (2001). 
Section 2526.1 states the following: 
 Any owner who is found by the DHCR, after a reasonable 
opportunity to be heard, to have collected any rent or other 
consideration in excess of the legal regulated rent shall be ordered to 
pay to the tenant a penalty equal to three times the amount of such 
excess, except as provided under subdivision (f) of this section . . . . 
If the owner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
overcharge was not willful, the DHCR shall establish the penalty as 
the amount of the overcharge plus interest. 
§ 2526.1(a)(1). 
113 Id. 
114 Zucker, supra note 67, at 121 n.28. 
115 Id. 
116 Lobbia, supra note 99, at 26. See also INCOME AND AFFORDABILITY 
STUDY, supra note 98, at 5. These numbers are likely to be exacerbated by the 
World Trade Center disaster, which has had strong unemployment effects on 
low-wage workers. A report by the Fiscal Policy Institute states that an 
estimated 60% of the 79,700 workers who were laid off as a result of the 
disaster had an average hourly wage of only $11.00 ($22,880 annual income). 
The five occupations most impacted by layoffs were waiters/waitresses, 
janitors/cleaners, retail workers, food preparation workers, and cashiers. 
FISCAL POLICY INSTITUTE, WORLD TRADE CENTER JOB IMPACTS TAKE A 
HEAVY TOLL ON LOW-WAGE WORKERS: OCCUPATIONAL AND WAGE 
IMPLICATIONS OF JOB LOSSES RELATED TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 WORLD TRADE 
CENTER ATTACK 2, tbl.3, available at http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/Nov 
5WTCreport.PDF (Nov. 5, 2001). 
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scheme has been pared down to the bare minimum required by 
the two theories that have been most strongly advanced 
throughout the city’s history with rent regulation—the fair market 
objective117 and the preservation of a tenant’s personhood 
interest.118 
New York’s history with rent control and rent stabilization 
demonstrates that the legislature’s objective, arguably, has 
always been to prevent unfair profiteering by owners at times 
when the market makes that profiteering possible.119 The rent 
control program began during the housing shortage of the World 
War II era, caused by a shift in production away from housing 
and toward materials needed for the war.120 When rent 
stabilization was introduced in the 1960s, it protected some of the 
best and newest of New York’s housing rather than limiting itself 
to low-income housing, the supply of which had already been 
increased by the construction of public housing.121 
Both rent control and rent stabilization are still subject to 
discontinuance today in the event that the citywide vacancy rate 
exceeds 5%.122 And the current Rent Stabilization Law still 
claims prevention of profiteering as one of its primary purposes: 
The council hereby finds that a serious public emergency 
continues to exist in the housing of a considerable number 
of persons within the city of New York . . .; that such 
emergency necessitated the intervention of federal, state 
and local government in order to prevent speculative, 
unwarranted and abnormal increases in rents; that there 
continues to exist an acute shortage of dwellings which 
creates a special hardship to persons and families 
occupying rental housing; . . . that such action is 
                                                          
117 See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text (defining the fair market 
objective). 
118 See infra notes 127-41 and accompanying text (defining the 
personhood interest). 
119 See Collins, supra note 47. 
120 Id. at 1312. 
121 Id. at 1313. 
122 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 26-414, 8623(b) (McKinney 2001), cited in 
Collins, supra note 47, at 1314. 
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necessary to prevent the exactions of unjust, unreasonable 
and oppressive rents and rental agreements and to 
forestall profiteering, speculation and other disruptive 
practices tending to produce threats to the public health, 
safety and general welfare.123 
One commentator calls this the “fair rent objective” and finds 
that it also explains recent amendments to the Rent Stabilization 
Law.124 Today in New York City, rents are high and the vacancy 
rate is low, making those apartments that are affordable to low-
income tenants even more scarce than the vacancy rate of 3.19% 
suggests.125 Thus, in order to protect low-income tenants against 
exorbitant rents, those tenants should be allowed to take in 
roommates as they need them.126 
A second justification for rent regulation that is relevant in 
the context of New York’s regulatory history is the 
“personhood” interest that a tenant holds in her home.127 
                                                          
123 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-501 (McKinney 2001) (emphasis added). 
124 Collins, supra note 47, at 1300. This explains why in 1993 a luxury 
decontrol amendment was designed to take out of regulation those tenants 
earning greater than $250,000 annual income while at the same time paying 
greater than $2000 in monthly rent. There is a scarcity of low-rent apartments 
available for less than $2000 per month, and for this reason, Collins explains, 
the legislature did not decontrol them even when occupied by rich tenants 
earning greater than $250,000 annually. Id. at 1317-19. However, this 
example demonstrates that a fair rent objective alone cannot explain the 
amendment because its effects were purposely limited to high-income tenants. 
Moderate-income tenants paying greater than $2000 per month did not have 
their units deregulated. A separate justification must have played a role is this 
limitation—either redistribution of wealth or the recognition that affordable 
rents are needed to preserve the tenure rights of low-income tenants but not 
high-income tenants. See Zucker, supra note 67, at 135-37 (noting the 
relationship between rent levels and tenure). 
125 See infra note 147 (citing the vacancy rates for lower-rent apartments). 
126 The Rent Guidelines Board explained the 5.5% increase in average 
building rent collections for rent stabilized buildings in 1999 as “most likely 
propelled by fewer vacancies and strong rent collections as demand for rental 
housing continued to outstrip supply.” INCOME AND EXPENSE STUDY, supra 
note 58, at 9. 
127 Radin, supra note 47, at 414. The findings behind the Emergency 
Price Control Act of 1942 expressed the purpose of preventing the “uprooting 
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Proponents of this view argue that a person’s interest in her home 
“is morally entitled to more weight than purely commercial 
landlording” because a person’s “individuality and selfhood 
become intertwined” with her home.128 Control over resources in 
the external environment, such as an apartment or house, gives a 
person an important sense of achievement and well-being.129 The 
U.S. Constitution affirms the special importance of the home by 
making it the locus of the right to privacy.130 Under this 
reasoning, taking in a roommate differs drastically from 
subletting because the tenant not only has a personal relationship 
with her roommate, as noted by the appellate division in 
Roughton-Hester, but maintains a personal relationship to her 
home. 131 A subletting tenant’s personhood interest in her home 
fades as she takes a new home for up to two years and her 
apartment approaches “fungible property,” defined as property 
“held merely instrumentally or for investment and exchange.”132 
The aspect of the New York rent regulation system that most 
directly reflects an interest in the personhood justification is the 
tenant’s tenure rights.133 Tenure rights, in relation to housing, 
derive from the recognition that as tenants become long-term 
occupants of their homes, they develop “a right not to be 
                                                          
[of] long-time city residents from their communities.” Emergency Price 
Control Act, 1942 N.Y. Laws 460, § 1, cited in Collins, supra note 47, at 
1314. 
128 Radin, supra note 47, at 414-15. 
129 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
PROPERTY LAW 8, 8 (Robert C. Ellison et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995). 
130 Id. at 17. 
131 520 East 81st St. Assocs. v. Roughton-Hester, 555 N.Y.S.2d 70, 73 
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1990) (reasoning that “[m]any roommates are not 
strangers, but individuals who choose to live together, apportioning the costs 
according to their respective financial abilities, and other considerations”). 
132 Radin, supra note 47, at 415. 
133 “Tenure” is defined as “[a] right, term or mode of holding lands or 
tenements in subordination to a superior.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1481 
(Bryan Garner ed., 7th ed. 1999). A residential tenant’s right to tenure is the 
“tenant’s presumptive right to continue in possession” of her home. Paul 
Sullivan, Security of Tenure for the Residential Tenant: An Analysis and 
Recommendations, 21 VT. L. REV. 1015, 1015 (1997). 
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uprooted, a right to call their place of residence a home with 
some of the same sense of permanence with which a homeowner 
uses the term.”134 The most important tenure right is the 
requirement that a landlord have a just cause for eviction.135 
Eviction control, however, is not the only regulation necessary to 
ensure tenure rights because there is always a level at which a 
tenant’s rising rent will force her to move.136 
The New York State Assembly seems to have focused on the 
personhood interest as its principal justification for regulating 
landlord-tenant relations in its recent enactments, but has done so 
in a way that neglects the effects of rent levels on tenure.137 For 
example, the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997, the most 
recent set of amendments to the Rent Stabilization Law, codified 
the more liberal definition of family eligible for succession rights 
that was part of the Rent Stabilization Code.138 Under this act, a 
tenant’s ability to pass on her home to her family is fortified. At 
the same time, however, the act limits a succeeding tenant’s right 
to the regulated rent level to only the first succeeding family 
member.139 Any subsequent succeeding family members can be 
charged the vacancy bonus.140 Thus, the legislature has focused 
on longevity over affordability. In this same act, the only other 
provision that could be characterized as pro-tenant is a new 
protection for tenants against certain types of landlord harassment 
intended to cause a tenant to vacate her apartment illegally.141 
                                                          
134 Zucker, supra note 67, at 127-28 (arguing for a system in which 
landlords would have to pay their tenants “insurance” for the loss of their 
tenure rights if they were to evict their tenants without cause). 
135 Id. at 128. 
136 See id. at 137. Limits on rent increases also reflect the goal of 
protecting personhood interests by allowing tenants to plan for predictable rent 
increases so that they are not forced out by them. Id. at 128. 
137 See infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text. 
138 See supra note 66 (outlining the statutory definition). 
139 Rent Regulation Reform Act, 1997 N.Y. Laws 116, § 22. 
140 Id.; see also supra note 60 (describing the 20% vacancy allowance). 
141 Rent Regulation Reform Act, 1997 N.Y. Laws 116, § 28. 
An owner is guilty of harassment of a rent regulated tenant when with 
intent to cause a rent regulated tenant to vacate a housing 
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Thus, the legislature again has demonstrated its concern for 
insuring the personhood interests of existing tenants. 
In his memorandum in support of the Rent Regulation Reform 
Act of 1997, Governor George Pataki voiced the prediction that 
“3 of every 4 apartments are expected to reach market levels as a 
result of the far-reaching reforms included in the bill,” including 
the vacancy bonus of 20%, supplemental vacancy bonuses, and 
luxury decontrol.142 To anyone cognizant of the effects of rent 
levels on a tenant’s ability to find adequate housing and of a 
tenant’s periodic need to move,143 it is surprising to read the 
governor’s repeated assertions in the same memorandum that 
“the bill continues to protect more than 99 percent of all 
currently regulated tenants and their families.”144 The governor’s 
concern is evidently focused upon a tenant’s interest in her 
established home, not upon the existence of adequate choices for 
a tenant in her housing search.145 This narrow focus has clearly 
contributed to the lack of affordable units in New York City. 
                                                          
accommodation, such owner: 1. With intent to cause physical injury 
to such tenant, causes such injury to such tenant or to a third person; 
or 2. Recklessly causes physical injury to such tenant or to a third 
person. 
Id. 
142 GOVERNOR’S PROGRAM BILL MEMORANDUM #72, A.8346, Ch. 116 
(New York State Legislative Annual 1997), at 74. 
143 Kim Phillips-Fein, Housing: The Hidden Issue, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 
4, 2000, at 26. Between 1993 and 1996, 35% of New York City’s rent 
regulated apartments turned over at least once. Id. See also Sullivan, supra 
note 133, at 1070. 
144 GOVERNOR’S PROGRAM BILL MEMORANDUM #72, supra note 142, at 
77. 
145 See Shaila K. Dewan, Deregulation by Landlords Is Increasing, Study 
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, § 1, at 37 (quoting one of the study’s 
authors as saying that “[t]he ability of anyone moving within the city or to the 
city to find a rent-regulated apartment is gone”). See also Zucker, supra note 
67, at 130 (“[H]ome is a place to establish identity. Identity requires change as 
much as continuity . . . . The goal should be to nurture identity by enlarging 
tenant choice.”). 
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2. Disparate Impact of Eviction 
A low-income tenant who is evicted from her apartment loses 
more than a middle- or upper-income tenant who is evicted.146 
That tenant’s search for a new apartment will be much more 
difficult because of a greater scarcity of apartments that low-
income tenants can afford.147 In fact, homelessness is a dangerous 
repercussion of evicting low-income tenants.148 Studies show that 
27.5% to 60% of homeless families became homeless as a result 
of eviction.149 From another viewpoint, among those tenants 
supported by public assistance who are evicted from their 
apartments, an estimated one-quarter will become homeless.150 
Commentators on rent regulation argue that a low-income 
tenant loses more when she is evicted, even when that eviction 
does not lead to homelessness, because low-income tenants invest 
more “psychic equity” into their apartments.151 “Psychic equity” 
has been defined as something that is derived “from the effort, 
attachment, and commitment required to turn one’s house or 
                                                          
146 See Karas, supra note 94, at 527. 
147 In 1999, the vacancy rate for apartments renting under $400 per month 
was 1.26%, rising slightly to 2.53% for apartments renting at $400-$499, and 
to 2.86% for apartments renting at $500-$599 per month. INCOME AND 
AFFORDABILITY STUDY, supra note 98, at 4. 
148 Karas, supra note 94, at 532. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. The repercussions of homelessness are harsh. For example, those 
who are homeless are more susceptible to illness (including such chronic 
diseases as hypertension, diabetes, traumatic disorders, and respiratory 
ailments). Id. at 532-34. A person is more likely to suffer from mental 
disorders as a result of homelessness (including dementia, severe depression, 
and substance addiction). Id. at 532-33. Homelessness takes its toll on a 
person’s ability to find a job, raise her family, build friendships, and 
participate in elections. Id. at 545-46. It increases a person’s likelihood of 
family separation, institutionalization, and imprisonment. Id. (arguing that 
indigent tenants have a right to counsel in New York eviction cases in part 
because of the harsh results of eviction for so many tenants). 
151 Zucker, supra note 67, at 134; see also EDGAR O. OLSEN, THE 
IMPACT OF VACANCY DECONTROL IN NEW YORK CITY: THE FIRST ESTIMATES 
FROM THE 1996 HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY 19, available at http:// 
www.housingnyc.com/research/html_reports/olsen.html (Nov. 1997). 
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apartment into a home.”152 Because their choices are limited, 
low-income tenants invest more psychic equity into making an 
apartment a home.153 This argument holds true for tangible 
investments as well. Rent stabilized tenants generally spend more 
time and money on both acquiring their apartments and on 
maintaining their apartments, since rent stabilized landlords are 
less likely to provide needed repairs.154 These arguments 
elucidate the concept of the “personhood” interest discussed 
above.155 
The fact that a tenant has taken in a roommate does not 
devalue those arguments. A tenant who takes in a roommate does 
not lose her personhood interest in the apartment even by 
charging her roommate a rent greater than the entire rent. A 
tenant’s personhood interest derives from the importance of her 
home to her sense of self.156 While the investment value of her 
apartment increases, its personal value does not consequentially 
decrease.157 Psychic equity may in fact be increased by the taking 
in of a roommate in that the process of finding an acceptable 
roommate to help pay the rent is a considerable investment.158 
3. Informal Exchange 
Tenants who take in roommates frequently offer something in 
exchange for a higher portion of the rent such as furnishings, 
utilities, food, chores, childcare, freedom from paying a security 
                                                          
152 Zucker, supra note 67, at 134. 
153 Id. at 135-36. 
154 Olsen, supra note 151, at 19. See also 1999 HOUSING AND VACANCY 
SURVEY, TABLE: NUMBER OF 1999 MAINTENANCE DEFICIENCIES, RENT-
OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS, available at http://www.housingnyc.com (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2002) (reporting U.S. Census research that 56.5% of 
unregulated units were free from deficiencies, while only 40% of stabilized 
units were). 
155 See Radin, supra note 47, at 414-15. See supra notes 127-32 and 
accompanying text (defining the personhood interest). 
156 Radin, supra note 47, at 414-15. 
157 See generally id. 
158 Zucker, supra note 67, at 134. 
DICKMACRO4-29.DOC 7/16/02 2:28 PM 
 REGULATING ROOMMATE RELATIONS 571 
deposit, and freedom from committing to a long-term lease.159 
When the rent paid by a tenant is not actually disproportionate, 
there is obviously no wrong warranting interference. A study 
conducted in three low-income neighborhoods in Chicago in the 
1980s suggests that this sort of in-kind exchange is more common 
among low-income tenants.160 It may also be more common 
between those who have social or familial ties, and in situations 
where the primary tenant is a senior citizen.161 Despite the fact 
that an in-kind exchange can make a roommate arrangement that 
is actually proportionate appear disproportionate, the strict 
language of the proportionality provision does not exempt these 
roommate arrangements from its restriction.162 In fact, the 
proportionality provision does not even allow for a greater share 
of the rent to be paid by a roommate who occupies a greater 
number of the rooms.163 
4. Lack of Representation 
While landlords are represented by counsel in approximately 
80% to 90% of summary eviction proceedings, tenants are 
represented in only 10% to 15% of such proceedings.164 The 
                                                          
159 See UNDER ONE ROOF, supra note 88, at 10; Burger Affidavit, supra 
note 93. 
160 UNDER ONE ROOF, supra note 88, at 17. 
161 Id. at 10; George C. Hemmens & Charles J. Hoch, Shared Housing in 
Low Income Households, in UNDER ONE ROOF, supra note 88, at 17; Jay 
Romano, Rent Rules: Codification or Stretch?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, § 
11, at 5 [hereinafter Rent Rules]. 
162 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2525.7 (2001) (“For the 
purposes of this subdivision, an occupant’s proportionate share shall be 
determined by dividing the legal regulated rent by the total number of tenants 
named on the lease and the total number of occupants residing in the subject 
housing accommodation.”). 
163 Id. § 2525.7. See also Romano, supra note 42, § 11, at 5. 
164 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956, 958 (Civ. Ct. 
1992). See also Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for 
Regulation of Lawyers’ Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 
CALIF. L. REV. 79 (1997) (describing the repercussions of that imbalance for 
legal negotiations and calling for the more ethical treatment of unrepresented 
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overwhelming majority of unrepresented tenants are poor, and 
many are people of color.165 Moreover, the presence or absence 
of representation profoundly affects the outcome of legal 
proceedings.166 Lack of representation is likely to have a 
particularly strong effect in cases concerning the proportionality 
provision because the interpretation of this provision is still open 
for argument.167 For example, the housing court in Mazzola 
interpreted the provision in relation to the concept of 
profiteering, holding that a tenant is subject to eviction without 
the opportunity to cure when that tenant charges her roommate a 
rent greater than the entire unit rent.168 The decision, however, 
does not stipulate the results for tenants who charge their 
roommates greater than a “proportionate” amount but less than 
the entire rent.169 Moreover, DHCR’s own general counsel 
disagrees with the court’s interpretation of the remedies provided 
by the provision, calling reliance on the Mazzola court’s decision 
                                                          
tenants in housing court where pressured negotiations between landlords’ 
lawyers and tenants are the norm). 
165 Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 958. One study found that only 17.3% of 
black tenants and 18.6% of Hispanic tenants were represented by lawyers 
whereas 32.7% of white tenants were. Female tenants were represented 
slightly less often than male tenants. Engler, supra note 164, at 108 n.130. 
166 Carol Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor 
Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized 
Experiment, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 419 (2001). This recent study, comparing a 
treatment group to a control group, found drastic differences even though only 
56% of the treatment group was given legal representation (compared to 4% 
of the control group). Of the treatment group, 32% had judgments entered 
against them, compared to 52% of the control group; 24% had warrants of 
eviction entered against them, compared to 44% of the control group; and 
19% were able to stipulate for a rent abatement due to repair problems, 
compared to 3% of the control group. Id. at 427. 
167 See Karas, supra note 94, at 549-50 (“Without mastering the relevant 
statutory provisions or case law, no tenant can conceivably hope to raise an 
effective defense against eviction.”). 
168 RAM I LLC v. Mazzola, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 2001, at 21:1 (Civ. Ct.), 
aff’d & remanded, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829 (Sup. App. Term. 1st 
Dep’t Dec. 28, 2001). 
169 Id. 
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to create a cause for eviction “misplaced.”170 Thus, there is room 
for argument, but these arguments will only be successfully made 
by tenants who are represented by counsel.171 
                                                          
170 Hirsch Affidavit, supra note 36, at ¶ 282. See also supra note 36 
(quoting DHCR’s interpretation of the provision as providing a claim to the 
overcharged roommate). 
171 See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (detailing Baltimore 
housing court study). Another legal issue that has yet to be resolved in the 
court’s treatment of the provision as grounds for eviction is the tenant’s 
accountability to the landlord for her actions. One landlord’s attorney wrote 
the following to his client’s tenant: 
 [You] are herewith demanded to . . . forthwith account to this office 
for any and all sums collected by you from your roommates or other 
persons who have occupied the apartment in the last two years. 
Unless I receive this information by close of business on February 6, 
2001, Landlord will move to terminate your tenancy based on 
wrongful conduct and seek your eviction from the Subject Premises. 
Exhibit A, Affidavit of Sara Jane Swanson in Support of Petition, Brooklyn 
Hous. & Family Services v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. and Cmty. Renewal, 
No. 14191/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 2001). See also Rent Rules, supra 
note 161, § 11, at 5 (quoting one tenant activist as fearing that the provision 
“allows the landlord to pry into [tenants’] personal finances” even before 
bringing an eviction action). The decision in Mazzola left open the question of 
whether landlords have the right to order their tenants to report their 
roommate arrangements upon demand or face eviction. It also left open the 
question of whether this reporting requirement can be written into a lease and 
whether such reports could be treated as admissions if they were to reveal 
disproportionalities of rents. 
 Such an interpretation would remove a large burden from the landlord in 
proving that a tenant is subject to eviction under the proportionality provision 
because a landlord would find it easy to gather the facts needed to commence 
an eviction. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 741[4] (McKinney 2001) 
(requiring that every petition to recover real property “[s]tate the facts upon 
which the special proceeding is based”); Gianni v. Stuart, 178 N.Y.S.2d 709, 
711 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1958) (“A tenant is entitled to a concise statement of 
the ultimate facts upon which the proceeding is predicated so that the issues, if 
any there be, are properly raised and can be met.”); City of New York v. 
Torres, 631 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 (App. Term 1st Dep’t 1995) (finding that 
facts were insufficient for an eviction action where landlord stated only that 
the building was “in a condition which endangers the life, health or safety of 
the occupants,” rather than alleging specific dangerous conditions). An 
interpretation of the provision as allowing landlords to demand information on 
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Access to pre-litigation information is equally disparate. Fifty 
percent of rent stabilized tenants do not even know that their 
units are regulated, information that is necessary to even begin 
understanding the applicable laws.172 DHCR has made no effort 
to inform tenants and tenant advocates of the implications of the 
proportionality provision; it has not published any operational 
bulletin or other written explanation to inform the public of the 
proportionality provision’s relevance and application.173 Because 
tenants can conceal rent-sharing arrangements by paying with one 
check, this disparity of access to information becomes especially 
important.174 Informed tenants will know not to pay with two 
checks that disclose the amount of rent paid by each party. 
Furthermore, compliance also requires a certain level of 
education and proficiency in the English language.175 Proper 
calculation of the proportionality formula requires a close reading 
of the statutory language and some mathematical ability.176 
A study of the Baltimore housing court found that the failure 
of tenants to successfully defend their cases was due in large part 
                                                          
their tenants’ roommate arrangements would also create disparate treatment 
between those tenants who know of the proportionality provision and have 
made the decision to lie to their landlords about their roommate arrangements, 
and those who do not. See generally Rent Rules, supra note 161. 
172 Olsen, supra note 151, at 18-19 (attributing this ignorance, in part, to 
the misperception that high regulated rents engender). 
173 Telephone Interview with Helpline Personnel, DHCR Rent Helpline 
(on Oct. 18, 2001). The staff at the Rent Helpline informed the author that the 
only written explanation of the roommate proportionality provision was the 
code itself. Id. 
174 See supra note 70 (citing the statutory basis for paying with one 
check). 
175 See Zucker, supra note 67, at 144 (“Given that illiteracy among the 
poor runs around three times higher than the level for the general population, 
understanding the fine-print legalese of the existing lease may not be possible 
for many.”); Karas, supra note 94, at 534-35. 
176 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (citing the statutory language 
of the proportionality provision). See also Karas, supra note 94, at 548-50; 
Seron, supra note 166, at 431 (surmising that the calculation of rent owed is 
one of the important functions that a tenant’s lawyer plays in their 
representation). 
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to their inability to be accommodated by the culture of the 
court.177 Poor tenants are more likely to understand the world in a 
relational way, taking into account the entire history of relations 
between people, which contrasts with a rule-oriented perspective 
applied by the courts.178 To these tenants, “rules are a series of 
‘they say,’ the power of which is felt in the paucity of relief to be 
had from the law’s abstractions and categories, made by people 
authorized to say what the law is.”179 Thus, tenants have 
difficulty translating rules and laws into their rights.180 Even 
when informed of their rights, unrepresented tenants in this study 
remained silent about their rights when standing before a 
judge.181 
Despite the familiar adage that ignorance of the law is no 
excuse, the courts have traditionally been sympathetic to ignorant 
and unrepresented parties when disparate representation has led 
to disparate results.182 For example, a tenant’s ignorance of the 
law can constitute good cause for vacating a stipulation when a 
tenant has unknowingly waived valid defenses to an eviction 
proceeding.183 The New York housing courts routinely set aside 
stipulations for this reason.184 One court stated, “Although 
stipulations are highly regarded by the courts and not lightly cast 
                                                          
177 Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination 
of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992). 
178 Id. at 586-87. 
179 Id. at 591. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 561, 591. 
182 Zucker, supra note 67, at 145 n.85 (“[O]ne of the fundamental 
justifications for government intervention is to reduce the costs and extent of 
asymmetric information.”). 
183 In re Estate of Frutiger, 272 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1971) (setting forth a 
“good cause” standard). 
184 See, e.g., Dearie v. Hunter, 676 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Civ. Ct. 1998) 
(where pro se tenant had waived defenses under the Spiegel Act and the Fair 
Rent Collection Practices Act); 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 
956 (Civ. Ct. 1992) (where pro se tenant had agreed to pay rent in excess of 
the legal regulated amount); Sicherman/Pomp v. Jenkins, 567 N.Y.S.2d 566 
(Civ. Ct. 1989) (where pro se tenant had waived the defense of warranty of 
habitability and improper rent amount). 
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aside, the court may do so in appropriate cases upon a showing 
of good cause. This is especially true where, as here, there is an 
unsophisticated tenant not represented by counsel and completely 
unaware of defenses available to them [sic].”185 
Additionally, ethical rules prevent parties from taking 
advantage of unrepresented persons by limiting communications 
between an attorney and an unrepresented person whose interests 
are contrary to the interests of the attorney’s client.186 Advice-
giving, for example, is prohibited.187 If an unrepresented party 
perceives a statement made by the other party’s lawyer to be 
advice, that statement is unethical regardless of whether it was 
intended as advice.188 Thus, the rules of ethics recognize the 
potential for misunderstandings by unrepresented parties and 
defer to their interpretation of the lawyer’s statements in order to 
best protect them. 
Based on this argument, a tenant should not necessarily be 
excused from complying with regulations simply because she is 
ignorant of them, but where possible, regulations should seek to 
avoid disparate impacts on those who are unrepresented. For 
example, in constructing a roommate protection, it may not be 
enough to provide tenants with an affirmative defense when their 
overcharge is justified.189 Tenants might not benefit from, for 
                                                          
185 Dearie, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 897 (citation omitted). 
186 New York Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(2), cited 
in Engler, supra note 164, at 85, 101. Disciplinary bodies in New York have 
the authority to impose sanctions including reprimand, referral to the court 
with a recommendation for censure, suspension, or disbarment. N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 605.14(a)(4) (1990), cited in Engler, supra note 
164, at 133 n.254. Unfortunately, Engler argues, the existing rules are 
frequently violated in part because the reporting responsibility does not lie 
with an independent body, but with clients and colleagues who have no 
incentive to file complaints against lawyers who mistreat unrepresented 
tenants. Engler, supra note 164, at 133-34. 
187 New York Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(2), cited 
in Engler, supra note 164, at 85. 
188 Engler, supra note 164, at 99. 
189 See Bezdek, supra note 177, at 561 (observing that whether a tenant 
held a legal defense and was cognizant of it was not the determining factor in 
her success in housing court). 
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example, an allowance for sharing the rent burden among family 
members, or an exemption in the case of economic hardship, 
because the majority of tenants will not be successful in arguing 
such defenses in court.190 Likewise, tenants should be given the 
opportunity to cure their errors without the grave repercussion of 
losing their homes. The proportionality provision, in contrast, 
has been read to provide an incurable basis for eviction, giving 
an unrepresented tenant no chance to pay back an overcharge 
before she is evicted.191 
III. A PROPER SOLUTION 
Both DHCR and the Mazzola court have erred in their design 
of a roommate overcharge provision, but the question remains 
whether one should exist at all. As set forth in Roughton-Hester, 
the tenant-roommate relationship is often a personal one and, 
arguably, should not be regulated.192 However, examining the 
tenant-roommate relationship from the perspective of several rent 
regulation theories demonstrates that some protection of 
roommates from overcharge is warranted.193 In some respects, 
the primary tenant’s access to the coveted commodity of housing 
in a tight housing market warrants treatment somewhat similar to 
the treatment given landlords. Under the reasoning of the fair 
market objective, it is clear that a tenant who takes advantage of 
the housing shortage to charge a roommate exorbitant rents can 
be prevented from doing so under the same justification that 
prevents a landlord from doing so.194 Indeed, this reasoning was 
                                                          
190 See generally Bezdek, supra note 177; Seron, supra note 166. 
191 RAM I LLC v. Mazzola, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 2001, at 21:1 (Civ. Ct.), 
aff’d & remanded, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829 (Sup. App. Term. 1st 
Dep’t Dec. 28, 2001), at *1. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text 
(discussing the decision in Mazzola). 
192 See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. 
193 See generally Collins, supra note 47, at 1300; Radin, supra note 47. 
194 See Collins, supra note 47, at 1300. However, a counter-argument 
under this reasoning might be that shared housing arrangements decrease the 
shortage of housing in a way that is relatively inexpensive. UNDER ONE ROOF, 
supra note 88, at 11. 
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used to justify limits on a tenant’s right to overcharge a 
sublettor.195 By promulgating a properly designed roommate 
overcharge provision, DHCR would therefore act within the Rent 
Stabilization Law’s stated purpose “to forestall profiteering, 
speculation, and other disruptive practices tending to produce 
threats to the public health,”196 and would thus avoid 
overstepping its authority.197 As laid out above, however, that 
provision needs to take into account the tenant’s economic 
needs.198 Moreover, under both the community preservation and 
redistribution of wealth theories, it is not clear that a roommate is 
less deserving of protection than a primary tenant.199 The 
justifications that provide support for a tenant’s overcharging her 
roommate, therefore, should have limits. 
A. The Exemptions Must Be Limited 
A careful analysis of the justifications for rent overcharge can 
delineate the limits of those justifications. For example, while a 
tenant’s economic need may justify her taking in a roommate at a 
disproportionate rent, the purpose of constructing such an 
exemption is to allow tenants to afford their escalating rents.200 
That justification, therefore, does not apply when a tenant’s rent 
from her roommate goes to pay expenses other than rent.201 Rent 
from a roommate beyond the level needed to pay the tenant’s rent 
                                                          
195 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (analyzing the purposes 
behind statutory limitations on subletting). 
196 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-501 (McKinney 2001). 
197 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (applying the ultra vires 
doctrine to the promulgation of the proportionality provision). 
198 See supra Part II.B.1. 
199 See infra Part III.A. 
200 See supra Part II.B.1. 
201 See supra note 58 (discussing the governmental takings doctrine). It 
may be argued that those expenses should be subsidized as well, many of them 
being just as essential to living as housing. That subsidy, however, should not 
come from other renters in need of housing or by means of the protection of 
rent regulation. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (quoting the Rent 
Stabilization Law’s stated purpose). 
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is true profiteering. It is difficult to determine that level for every 
individual, and such a determination would be prohibitively 
cumbersome in a court or administrative proceeding, requiring 
formulas akin to those used by welfare agencies and 
documentation of all income and any extraordinary expenses.202 
One approach would be to set that level at the unit’s entire rent. 
The rent that a tenant earns from her roommate above the unit’s 
rent, as a rule, does not go toward protecting her housing in an 
unfair housing market, and should not be protected by rent 
regulation.203 
An alternative would be to set that level at the average 
welfare assistance payment for a household equal in size to the 
tenant’s, on the assumption that the welfare shelter allowance is a 
good indicator of the minimum income that a household would be 
able to contribute toward rent.204 Thus, the roommate could bring 
an overcharge action if she were paying a rent greater than the 
entire unit rent minus the shelter allowance for which the tenant 
might be eligible.205 There are several problems, however, with 
this more conservative formula. First, it is not an accurate 
indication of minimum household income because not all tenants 
are eligible for welfare; therefore, some of the poorest tenants 
might be deprived of their tenancies despite a legitimate 
justification.206 Second, the complexity of the formula would 
                                                          
202 See, e.g., BARRY STROM, PUBLIC BENEFITS IN NEW YORK § PA, at 
123-206 (1998 ed.) (describing the process of calculating eligibility and 
benefits for the Family Assistance and Safety Net Assistance programs over 
the course of more than eighty pages). 
203 See supra note 196 and accompanying text (quoting the Rent 
Stabilization Law’s stated purpose). 
204 See Anderson, supra note 104, at 1:2 (reporting the current monthly 
shelter allowance for a family of four in Manhattan as $312). 
205 See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2522.1, 
2526.1 (2001) (prescribing the following overcharge action that a tenant may 
take against a landlord: “[a]ny owner who is found by DHCR . . . to have 
collected any rent or other consideration in excess of the legal regulated rent 
shall be ordered to pay the tenant a penalty equal to three times the amount of 
such excess”). 
206 See STROM, supra note 202, § PA, at 11, 61-106. The 1996 welfare 
reforms put into effect a sixty-month lifetime limit on receipt of Family 
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cause the same problems discussed above for tenants with less 
education and without legal representation.207 
The similar statuses of tenants and their roommates also limit 
the justifications under which a tenant’s interests should be 
protected at any cost. For example, the community preservation 
theory supports the protection of long-term tenants and 
recognizes their need to take in roommates at disproportionate 
rents over time as tenant incomes may decrease with retirement, 
and as rents increase.208 Nonetheless, this theory also supports the 
protection of roommates. As discussed above, roommates may be 
long-term members of the community even if they have not lived 
in their units for a long time because of the informal means by 
which tenants typically advertise for roommates.209 Likewise, the 
redistribution of wealth perspective does not clearly favor the 
tenant over her roommate so as to justify limitless 
overcharging.210 While statistics on their relative wealth are not 
available, there is no reason to believe that people seeking rooms 
to rent are generally richer than those who already have 
stabilized apartments and are seeking roommates. Thus, a 
roommate overcharge protection is warranted to prevent 
unjustifiable redistribution of wealth from roommates to 
tenants.211 
B. Provision Design 
Economic need, informal exchange, and ignorance of the law 
should all be recognized as justifications for overcharging a 
roommate under any code that attempts to regulate roommate 
relations, both because these reasons excuse the tenant and 
because exemptions based on these reasons prevent disparate 
                                                          
Assistance, id. § PA, at 11, as well as an exclusion of benefits to some groups 
of non-citizens, id. § PA, at 61-106. 
207 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
208 Radin, supra note 47, at 417-18. 
209 See ZANY’S, supra note 89, at 314-15. 
210 Radin, supra note 47, at 412. 
211 See Collins, supra note 47, at 1305. 
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effects on low-income tenants.212 Those exemptions, however, 
are limited by the extent to which the protection of roommates is 
also warranted. Thus, as the discussion above has already 
demonstrated, designing a roommate overcharge provision to 
encompass all of these goals is somewhat difficult. 
An important consideration in the remedy must be the 
innocence of the roommate.213 The case law around succession 
rights, for example, recognizes that “[i]mproprieties committed 
by the departed household member . . . cannot defeat the right of 
the remaining household member to succeed to the tenancy.”214 
Likewise, the roommate is an innocent party when the primary 
tenant charges her an excessive rent, and should be treated as 
such. Transfer of the tenancy to the roommate who has been 
overcharged is one potential remedy that recognizes the 
roommate’s innocence.215 A problem with this remedy is that it, 
unfortunately, creates an incentive for collusion both at the 
expense of the primary tenant and at the expense of the landlord. 
The landlord may approach the roommate and encourage her to 
disclose the facts of her rental agreement in order to have the 
primary tenant evicted and to give the roommate the right to the 
tenancy.216 This danger, however, can be mitigated by giving the 
tenant an opportunity to cure the overcharge by lowering the 
roommate’s rent to an amount equal to or below the entire unit 
rent within ten days of receiving notice from the landlord.217 In 
                                                          
212 See supra Part II (explaining how such circumstances justify 
exemption). 
213 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (contrasting the 
remedies given sublettors when primary tenants are found to be profiteering at 
their expense). 
214 I.N. Ovington Corp. v. Surdo, N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1998, at 25:3 (Civ. 
Ct.) (assigning the tenancy to an innocent successor despite the primary 
tenant’s failure to report that person’s presence and income on her application 
for a Senior Citizens Rent Increase Exemption). See also Levine v. Costanzo, 
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 17, 1994, at 24:3 (App. Term 1st Dep’t). 
215 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (citing the use of this 
remedy when a subletting tenant is found to have an “illusory tenancy”). 
216 See Court OKs Eviction, supra note 69, at 11 (“Once the roommate 
learns that the tenant is violating the law, try to get his cooperation.”). 
217 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2524.3(a) (2001) 
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addition, collusion might be discouraged by permitting no 
vacancy allowance to be added to the roommate’s new base rent, 
thus removing the landlord’s incentive to collude.218 
On the other hand, the vacancy allowance is needed to protect 
the landlord against collusion between the tenant and roommate. 
For example, a tenant who plans to move out of her unit 
permanently, but would like to give a friend the opportunity to 
have this rent-stabilized unit without competing with others, 
might spuriously overcharge that friend and cause her own 
eviction. This would provide a means of avoiding the 
requirements put in place for succession rights.219 This danger 
could be mitigated by limiting the remedy of transferring the 
tenancy to the roommate to cases in which the roommate had 
lived in the unit for more than one or two years, creating a 
veritable succession right for the roommate. Giving the 
roommate a right to the tenancy, however, differs in an important 
respect from a succession right or the reassignment of the 
tenancy to a sublettor where an illusory tenancy is found. It 
evicts from her home a tenant who still lives in that home and has 
a personhood interest in it.220 For these reasons, the transfer of 
the tenancy to the roommate is not the best remedy for a 
roommate overcharge. 
A roommate overcharge provision should instead provide 
roommates with a cause for reimbursement in cases where they 
are being charged a rent greater than the entire unit rent.221 In 
this way, those tenants who cannot afford even half of their rent 
                                                          
(allowing eviction on the grounds of a violation of a substantial obligation of 
the lease only when the tenant has “failed to cure such violation after written 
notice of the owner that the violations cease within 10 days”). 
218 See supra note 60 and accompanying text (outlining the statutory 
vacancy allowance). 
219 See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (discussing succession 
rights). 
220 See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text (defining the 
personhood interest). 
221 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2522.1, 2526.1 
(2001) (providing tenants with a cause of action for reimbursement against 
landlords charging illegal initial rents and illegal rent increases). 
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will not be penalized for taking in roommates out of economic 
need. This also avoids the inevitable disparate repercussions that 
an eviction action poses to poor tenants, who are less likely to be 
represented and more likely to become homeless upon losing 
their tenancy.222 This solution allows tenants who are ignorant of 
the regulation at least some opportunity to correct their errors 
without losing their homes. Moreover, access to information and 
legal representation is likely to be more equal between a tenant 
and her roommate than between a landlord and tenant, making 
the tenant-roommate dispute more equitable than that between a 
landlord and tenant.223 Finally, the informal exchange of 
resources in the place of rent should be an affirmative defense to 
a roommate overcharge if greater or equal in value to the 
overcharge.224 It should be clearly written into the provision so 
that tenants and judges are aware of it.225 
CONCLUSION 
The roommate proportionality provision was enacted with 
two debilitating flaws.226 These errors show the true nature of the 
provision as a tool for weakening tenant rights in the guise of 
expanding protections to roommates.227 As applied by the courts 
                                                          
222 See supra Parts II.B.2, 4. 
223 See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (citing a great gap in 
representation between landlords and tenants). 
224 See supra Part II.B.3. 
225 But see supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (citing Bezdek’s 
assertion that tenants do not successfully argue affirmative defenses unless 
represented). 
226 See supra Part II.A-B (explaining that the remedy must not lie with the 
landlord and that there must be exemptions for overcharging when the tenant 
is justified in doing so). 
227 Court OKs Eviction, supra note 69, at 10. At least some landlords give 
no thought to the protection of roommates through the provision. One landlord 
newsletter informed its readers of the following options: 
 Most leases bar tenants from violating the law. So if a tenant 
overcharges a roommate in violation of the code, you can also seek 
the tenant’s eviction based on breach of the lease. But there’s a 
downside to this strategy . . . a court might give the tenant a chance 
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thus far, the provision places the remedy for an overcharge in the 
hands of the landlord rather than the roommate.228 It gives the 
landlord a means by which to evict entire units instead of giving 
roommates protection against overcharge akin to those that 
primary tenants hold.229 Moreover, the misapplication of this 
provision prevents roommates from choosing disproportionate 
rental arrangements even if more affordable to them, and 
prevents unmarried couples from sharing their rent as they see 
fit.230 Additionally, the provision sets forth a resolute prohibition 
against disproportionate rents that does not allow for needed 
exceptions.231 If applied without an opportunity to cure, without 
consideration of the desperate economic straights of many New 
York City tenants, and without adjustments for informal 
exchanges, the provision will unjustly prevent many tenants from 
maintaining and affording their homes.232 For these reasons, the 
provision cannot stand as written. 
The purpose of the Rent Stabilization Law is “to prevent 
exactions of unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive rents and rental 
agreements and to forestall profiteering, speculation, and other 
disruptive practices tending to produce threats to the public 
health, safety, and general welfare.”233 While proponents of the 
proportionality provision jumped on the term “profiteering” in 
                                                          
to correct the lease violation by returning the overcharge amount and 
charging the roommate a lower rent in accordance with the code 
requirements. That’s why it’s better to sue to evict the tenant for 
violating the code. 
Id. 
228 RAM 1 LLC v. Mazzola, No. 01-294, 2001 WL 1682829 (Sup. App. 
Term. 1st Dep’t Dec. 28, 2001), at *1. 
229 See supra note 205 (citing statutory basis for the tenant overcharge 
action). 
230 See LAMBDA Memo, supra note 63. 
231 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting language of 
proportionality provision); Part II.B (arguing that some sort of exemptions or 
accommodations are needed in cases of economic need, disparate impact, 
informal exchange, and lack of representation). 
232 See supra Part II.B. 
233 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-501 (McKinney 2001). 
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order to justify the eviction of a large number of tenants living 
with roommates, the scarcity of affordable units today requires 
that the statutory language be applied more carefully.234 Because 
so many tenants must take in roommates at disproportionate rents 
in order to afford their homes, and because the repercussions of 
eviction in this market are so harsh, eviction of those tenants is 
undoubtedly a “disruptive practice” that would produce a threat 
to the public welfare.235 
Likewise, leaving roommates with no protection against those 
tenants who are truly profiteering by charging them greater than 
the unit rent would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Rent 
Stabilization Law. By adopting a limited and effective roommate 
protection, DHCR would avoid Governor Pataki’s shortsighted 
assumption that to protect current tenancies is to protect all 
tenants.236 Tenants navigating today’s housing market must 
frequently become roommates to existing tenants.237 The 
protection of roommates, therefore, insures that all tenants have 
adequate choices of affordable rooms and units. 
For all of these reasons, the proportionality provision should 
be invalidated and roommates should be given the benefit of a 
cause of action in overcharge against their primary tenants when 
they are being charged rent greater than the entire unit rent and 
are not receiving in return additional services of equal or greater 
value to that overcharge. 
 
                                                          
234 See, e.g., supra note 41 and accompanying text (characterizing Ms. 
Mazzola’s actions as “profiteering”). See also supra note 147 (describing the 
scarcity of affordable units). 
235 § 26-501. 
236 See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text (citing Governor 
Pataki’s optimistic assessment of the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997). 
237 See supra note 59 (citing high rates of apartment sharing). 
